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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF OREM, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES H BROWN, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 20050463-CA 
Trial Court Case Number: 055204006 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM THE MAY 18, 2005 ORDER OF THE 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OREM COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Robert J. Church, Esq. 
Orem City Attorney's Office 
56 North State Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
Attorney for Appellee 
James Brown 
255 W. 2000 S 
Orem, UT 84058 
Pro Se Appellant 
UTAH APPELLATE C 
SEP 28 2006 
GOOD FAITH CERTIFICATION 
I certify that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
The Utah Supreme Court, by order dated October 16, 2003, approved the 
Standards of Professionalism and Civility, which states the following in the preamble 
(emphasis added): "A lawyer's conduct should be characterized at all times by personal 
courtesy and professional integrity in the fullest sense of those terms. In fulfilling a duty 
to represent a client vigorously as lawyers, we must be mindful of our obligations to the 
administration of justice, which is a truth-seeking process designed to resolve human 
and societal problems in a rational, peaceful, and efficient manner. We must remain 
committed to the rule of law as the foundation for a just and peaceful society. 
"Conduct that may be characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or 
obstructive impedes the fundamental goal of resolving disputes rationally, peacefully, and 
efficiently. Such conduct tends to delay and often to deny justice. " 
It is my opinion that the Appellee, City of Orem (the "City"), has not followed 
these standards in this case and that their behavior has prejudiced me and violated my 
constitutional rights. 
I believe that Mr. Church's behavior in ignoring the statute he knew to be in effect 
at the time of the alleged violation can rightly be characterized as "obstructive" and as a 
consequence justice has been denied. Had I not previously emailed him citing the proper 
statute, and had he not prosecuted numerous cases under the new statute prior to mine, 
and had the original citation he was amending from not been for 41-6a violation, and had 
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I not objected at trial, and had I not been a pro se defendant, then perhaps you could pass 
this off as a simple, harmless mistake. However, all of this taken together, I believe, 
shows an intention to obstruct the process and throw off an inexperienced adversary. 
Mr. Church continues to obstruct the process by misstating facts of the case in the 
Appellee's brief. On page 2 he states, "Southbound traffic was forced to narrow to one 
lane to get by the accident." This is clearly refuted by the videotape and was discussed at 
length at trial. See Transcript at ^25, Line 17 through ^|28, Line 21; and | 4 1 , Line 11 
through ^42, Line 5. On page 3 of his brief he states "The tape shows that virtually 
dozens and dozens, if not hundreds of vehicles turned into either parking lot or turned 
around and headed southbound." Again, this is clearly refuted by the videotape and was 
discussed at length. See Transcript at [^50, Lines 6 through 15. These misleading 
statements in Appellee's brief are not indicative of "personal courtesy and professional 
integrity in the fullest sense of those terms. " I believe that the City's obstructive behavior 
has delayed and denied justice in this case. 
I am not a lawyer; I am an ordinary citizen who is trying to achieve the goal, stated 
in the above preamble, of "justice, which is a truth-seeking process" in this matter. I do 
not believe that justice has been served and I believe that the City has obstructed the 
truth-seeking process in numerous ways from the very beginning of this case all the way 
though the appeals process. Because justice was denied I am petitioning this Court to 
rehear the appeal and vacate the judgment of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. At the very outset, officer Snyder acted inappropriately by striking my vehicle as 
he approached from the rear. He admitted at trial, under direct examination, that he was 
frustrated. See Transcript at ]f25, Lines 4 through 12. The result of his frustration was 
that he physically struck my vehicle and verbally assaulted and intimidated my son and 
me. I requested that officer Snyder simply walk back and look at the arrangement of the 
police cars so he could see that they were directing traffic around the scene into the 
southbound traffic. See Transcript at |23, Lines 13 through 16. He refused to do this and 
continued to verbally abuse me. If he had taken a minute to look at the scene, he would 
have realized, as he did at trial, that they were directing traffic to go exactly where I went, 
into southbound traffic. See Transcript at f21, Lines 10 through 17. 
i I 
2. Officer Snyder failed to uniformly enforce the law, in compliance with Article I, 
Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution, when he arbitrarily opted not to enforce the 41-
6a-701 provisions on other similarly situated drivers. Office Snyder testified that he 
observed several vehicles go around the scene into southbound traffic, then back over the 
raised median (a separate violation) into the northbound lanes. See Transcript at <|8, 
Lines 11 through 16. However, none of these drivers were stopped or cited for any 
I 
violation. Further, you can see on the videotape evidence that when I went around the 
scene, six other cars followed me around. Again, none of these cars were stopped or 
ticketed. To ticket me and not ticket someone similarly situated violates Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah State Constitution as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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3. I was not allowed to present my entire defense at trial. I was summarily excused 
after presenting the videotape and not allowed to finish presenting my defense. While 
Mr. Church was queried as to whether he was finished, I was not asked and I gave no 
indication that I was finished. See Transcript at 1J35, Lines 21 through 23; and Tf52, Lines 
13 through 18. I was denied a fair trial because I was not allowed to present my entire 
defense. After reviewing the videotape it was my intention to recall officer Snyder and 
have him recant the numerous statements in his testimony that clearly contradicted the 
videotape evidence (e.g. how long he was at the scene before I arrived, how many cars 
went by, whether other cars went around to the left, whether there were cones on the 
south side of the scene, how many lanes were blocked, etc.). My intent was to show that 
he did not have a good recollection of the incident and that he was confusing events that 
occurred after I arrived with those that occurred before I arrived. I also had an additional 
aerial photograph of the scene that I intended to introduce showing exactly where the 
police cars were positioned at the time I arrived, based on the videotape evidence. 
4. In rendering his decision, Judge Backlund states as the basis for his decision facts 
that are completely contrary to the evidence presented both by the prosecution and the 
defense. For example, he states that everyone before me went either left into Home Base 
or right into Wal*Mart. See Transcript at [^52, Line 23 through [^8, Line 1. This is 
completely contrary to the videotape evidence (which shows numerous cars, and a UTA 
bus, going around to the left) and to the direct testimony of officer Snyder. See 
Transcript at ^8, Lines 11 through 16; and [^48, Line 6 through [^49, Line 10. He also 
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asserts that I was not directed to go into the southbound lanes, which, again, is contrary to 
the testimony of officer Snyder, my son, and myself; and to my basic assertion at the 
scene and at trial that the arrangement of the police cars was directing traffic into the 
southbound lanes. See Transcript at ]f9, Line 20 through f 10, Line 3; ^ [10, Line 17 
through f 11, Line 1; 121, Lines 10 through 17; |23, Lines 13 through 16; |38, Line 22 
through ^39, Line 1. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution states that "[a]ll laws of general 
nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has shown that a 
violation of this standard is reversible error. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (1995). In 
Mohi, the Supreme Court held that "Utah's uniform operation of laws provision 
establishes different requirements than does the federal Equal Protection Clause. The 
most important of these requirements, for the present analysis, is the requirement that "for 
a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its 
face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
Page 5 
uniformly if'persons similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly'...." Id.) (quoting 
Malan, 693 P.2d at 669)." Mohi at 37. 
Because the actions of the State in this case fail the test established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in interpreting Article I, Section 24, the actions of the State amount to 
reversible error and the judgment of the trial court should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
At the most basic level this case comes down to the fact that I was singled out (in 
violation of the Utah Constitution) and convicted for following the instructions of the 
police who, by officer Snyder's own testimony, were not directing traffic themselves, but 
instead left their police cars in the road to direct traffic and had them arranged in a 
manner that directed traffic into the southbound lanes. I am not seeking to overturn the 
lower court ruling, I am simply asking for a fair and impartial trial where all the facts of 
the case can be evaluated. 
WHEREFORE, for the above-mentioned reasons, the APPELLANT asks this 
Court for relief, including rehearing the appeal and vacating of the judgment of the lower 
Court. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 2006. 
James H. Brown —•— 
Pro Se Appellant and Defendant 
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